Is voting skin-deep? Estimating the effect of candidate ballot photographs on election outcomes

Andrew Leigh, Tirta Susilo

Abstract

In the Northern Territory, Australia, ballot papers for territory elections depict candidates’ photographs. We exploit this unusual electoral feature by looking at the effect that candidates’ beauty and skin color has on voting patterns. Our results for beauty are mixed, but we find strong evidence that skin color matters. In electorates with a small Indigenous population, lighter-skinned candidates receive more votes, while in electorates with a high number of Indigenous people, darker-skinned candidates are rewarded at the ballot box. The relationship between skin color and electoral performance is stronger for challengers than incumbents. We explain this with a model in which voters use skin color as a proxy for some underlying characteristic which they value only to the extent that they share the trait.

1. Introduction

It has long been recognized that voters make decisions based on limited information. As Matsusaka (2005) observes, ‘decades of survey research have shown that most voters are uninformed to the point of ignorance about public policy, politics and government in general’. Lacking a comprehensive knowledge of political issues, electors frequently use rules of thumb, or ‘information shortcuts’; extrapolating from limited information to make a decision.
In this paper, we look at the effect of an unusual cue: ballot paper photographs. Specifically, we look at the extent to which candidates’ beauty and skin color are related to voter behavior. Other things equal, the presence of photographs on the ballot paper should increase the salience of this cue for voter decisions.

To test for the effects of skin color and beauty on voting, we take advantage of a unique dataset. For territory elections in the Northern Territory, Australia, photographs of candidates are published on the ballot paper, adjacent to their names. Such ballot papers are unique within Australia, and – so far as we are aware – the developed world. They therefore provide us with an opportunity to learn more about the extent to which voter behavior is associated with the facial characteristics of candidates.

To preview our findings, we observe that in elections where candidates’ photographs appear on the ballot paper, more attractive candidates are more likely to win. However, the aspect of the candidate’s appearance that matters most is not beauty, but skin color. In electorates with a large share of Indigenous voters, candidates with darker skin receive more votes, while in electorates with a small share of Indigenous voters, having lighter skin brings a larger electoral benefit.

Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines a simple theoretical model of candidate cues and discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the political context and data used in our study. Section 4 presents results, and Section 5 concludes.

2. A simple model of candidate cues

To begin, it is useful to outline a simple theoretical model of the way in which candidate characteristics might affect voter behavior. Let $U_{ij}$ be the utility received by voter $i$ in supporting candidate $j$. Now suppose that this is a function of two candidate characteristics. The first characteristic, $X_j$, is a trait that is *universally liked*. The second, $Z_j$, is a *voter-dependent* characteristic, meaning that it is liked by voters who share it, but disliked by voters who do not share it. Formally:

$$U_{ij} = F(X_j, Z_j)$$

Now suppose that we normalize the share of the population who have trait $Z_j$ to have a mean of zero, and the share of candidates who have trait $Z_j$ to also have a mean of zero. Assuming that the distributions of $Z_j$ and $Z_i$ are symmetrical, then if the median voter theorem holds:

$$\frac{dU_{ij}}{dX_j} \geq 0$$

$$\frac{dU_{ij}}{dZ_j} \geq 0$$

Such a simple typology of candidate cues can be used to separate many of the standard findings on voter behavior. A candidate characteristic that is universally liked ($X_j$) might be personal integrity, experience, and intelligence. A candidate characteristic ($Z_j$) that interacts with a voter characteristic ($Z_i$) might be income (e.g. rich voters prefer rich candidates, poor voters prefer poor candidates) or ideology (e.g. left-wing voters prefer left-wing candidates, right-wing voters prefer right-wing candidates).

Now suppose that instead of directly observing $X_j$ and $Z_j$, voters instead observe noisy signals, $x_j$ and $z_j$, such that

$$x_j = X_j + \epsilon_j$$

$$z_j = Z_j + \mu_j$$

Assuming that $\epsilon_j$ and $\mu_j$ are mean-zero, normally distributed disturbance terms, these noisy signals of voter traits ($x_j$ and $z_j$) will be positively correlated with voters’ utility.

$$\frac{dU_{ij}}{dx_j} \geq 0$$

$$\frac{dU_{ij}}{dz_j} \geq 0$$

It is important to note that our model does not assume that voters are rational in the sense that they cast their ballot with the aim of bringing about a particular political outcome. Although our model is quite consistent with rational voter models, it also accords with models of expressive voting, in which constituents do not expect their vote to have any impact on the election result (see e.g. Brennan & Lomasky, 1993).

In this paper, we focus on two such noisy signals – candidate beauty and candidate skin color. Drawing on prior face attractiveness literature, we expect that candidate beauty will be a universally liked trait. Psychological evidence has shown that facial features are one of the initial bases for categorical judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In a meta-analysis of 919 studies, Langlois et al. (2000) find that attractive children and adults are judged more positively than unattractive people, and are also treated more positively. This finding appears to be robust across countries, cultures, and contexts, including in elections. Attractive candidates have been shown to win more votes in elections to the national parliaments of Australia (King & Leigh, 2006), Finland (Berggren, Jordahl, & Poutvaara, 2006) and Germany (Klein & Rosar, 2005). In the US, candidates whose faces were judged to be more competent won more votes in actual elections (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Better-looking candidates are also more likely to win elections to become an officer of the American Economic Association (Hamermesh, 2006) and a member of a British community board (Banducci, Thrasher, Rallings, & Karp, 2003).
By contrast, we expect that candidate skin color will be a voter-dependent trait. As in the deep south of the United States, the Northern Territory is a jurisdiction where racial politics have typically been important (Goot, 2006; Jaensch, 2002; Worthington, 2001). We therefore expect that Indigenous voters will prefer candidates who support extending land rights and benefits to the Indigenous community, while non-Indigenous voters will tend to oppose such candidates. Voters who do not know a particular candidate’s position on these issues may instead use skin color as a proxy for policy positioning and as an indication of whether a candidate belongs to an in-group rather than an out-group.3

Face processing literature speaks of the substantial difference in the psychological and neural processing of same-race faces versus other-race faces (Eberhardt, 2005; Phelps & Thomas, 2002). Perhaps the most relevant finding here is that attention to race seems to occur automatically even in the very early stage of face processing (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001). Most existing evidence indicates that voters are more likely to support candidates who are like themselves on some salient dimension, such as gender or race. Polling evidence has shown that voters used candidates’ gender and race as a cue to policy positions (McDermott, 1998). Experimental studies with college students also demonstrated that voters’ choices were affected by similarities of gender and race (Adams, 1975; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). Among white participants, an experimental study showed that even when policy positions were held constant, darker-skinned African–American candidates were less favored than lighter-skinned African–American candidates (Terkildsen, 1993). Outside the laboratory, police (Donohue & Levitt, 2001; Antonovics & Knight, 2004), basketball referees (Price & Wolﬀers, 2007), and employers making hiring or promotion decisions (Stoll, Raphael, & Holzer, 2004; Stauffer & Buckley, 2005) have been found to treat those of a different race more harshly than those of their own race.4

However, we should not overlook the possibility that skin color – like beauty – could be a universally liked trait. There is some laboratory evidence supporting this view. Maddox and Gray (2002) presented photographs of light-skinned and dark-skinned African–Americans to black and white college students. They found that among both black and white experimental subjects, images of lighter-skinned people were judged more positively across a number of traits. Similarly, Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002) found that both black and white participants in an Implicit Association Test showed a subconscious bias towards white faces over black faces. However, we are not aware of any evidence that these biases – to the extent that they exist – lead blacks to favor whites when making conscious choices. Our interpretation of the evidence is that when making a conscious decision (such as casting a ballot, making an arrest, or hiring a new worker) both blacks and whites tend to exhibit a same-race preference. Our study can be regarded as a further test of this hypothesis.

An important point to note about our empirical strategy is that we analyze results not at the individual level, but at the electoral level. Although we will tend to interpret our results as indicative of individual-level patterns, it is nonetheless possible that our results are driven by unobserved factors that are correlated with the individual demographics in our dataset (the so-called ‘ecological fallacy’ problem).

3. Institutional context and data

Our data in this paper are drawn from the Northern Territory election held on 18 June 2005. The Northern Territory has a unicameral parliament, with 25 seats in the Legislative Assembly. In the previous election (held in 2001), the centre-left Australian Labor Party had won ofﬁce for the ﬁrst time since the Northern Territory attained self-government in 1978. In the 2005 election, the Australian Labor Party further increased its majority, winning 19 of the 25 seats.

Although voting is compulsory (and failure to vote was punishable by a ﬁne of $110 in the 2005 election), turnout in Northern Territory elections has always been relatively low (Shepheard, 2005, p. 17). This is due partly to the region’s low population density. In the 2005 election, 89,646 people voted, which equated to 80% of those on the electoral roll. Four percent of the votes cast were informal, so our sample consists of 86,288 votes. Although Northern Territory elections use a preferential voting system, we do not exploit this feature of the data, since our focus is on a voter’s most favored candidate.

As discussed above, an unusual feature of Northern Territory elections is that candidates’ photographs appear on the ballot paper. Under the Electoral Act (NT 2004) and Electoral Regulations (NT 2004), all candidates are required to submit a black and white, full-faced vertical portrait of the nominee’s head and shoulders, taken within 6 months before lodgment of the nomination. The 2005 election was not the ﬁrst Northern Territory election in which candidates’ photographs were on the ballot5, but it was the ﬁrst Northern Territory election in which ballots had shown both photographs and party names.

Our voting data are drawn from the website of the Northern Territory Electoral Ofﬁce, which publishes the number of votes received by each candidate, and demographic proﬁles of each electorate. These demographic proﬁles are based upon

---

3 For a thorough analysis of the biological determinants of skin color, see Jablonski (2006).
4 Another literature ﬁnds that among minority groups in the US, lighter-skinned workers earn higher wages. This appears to hold true for African–Americans (Goldsmith, Hamilton, & Darby, 2006; Goldsmith, Hamilton, & Darby, 2007; see also Hersch, 2006), Mexican–Americans (Mason, 2004), and new immigrants (Hersch, 2008) (we are not aware of any studies that have analyzed the relationship between skin color and wages in Australia). However, this does not necessarily speak to the question of whether there is an interaction between the skin color of the employer and the employee, since the wage studies do not contain information on the employer’s skin color. Given that most employers are white; their preferences are likely to overwhelm those of non-white employers in any empirical analysis.
5 The history of ballot photos in the Northern Territory dates back to the 1980 election. The photos were initially introduced as a part of an integrative effort to simplify voting procedure. Specifically, the photos were intended to assist voters with a low level of literacy and voters who need signiﬁcant help from others in casting their vote (Jaensch & Loveday, 1981). Adding photographs to the ballot paper was associated with a 2% increase in turnout (from 75.9% in 1977 to 77.9% in 1980), but no noticeable change in the rate of informal voting.
data from the 2001 Australian Census, matched to the electoral boundaries as they were for the 2005 election. The profiles provide information on several characteristics of the electorate, including the share of the population that self-identifies as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander.

Ballot papers were supplied to us in electronic form by Bill Shepheard, the Northern Territory Electoral Commissioner. Following a determination from the Northern Territory Information Commissioner that electoral ballots are not public documents, Mr. Shepheard sought permission for us to use the ballot papers, by contacting agents for all political parties who ran candidates, and directly contacting all independent candidates. Only one candidate (an independent who ran in the division of Nightcliff) denied permission, and that candidate is excluded from our results. Our dataset therefore contains information on 79 of the 80 candidates who ran for election in 2005.

Fig. 1 shows a sample ballot paper from the 2005 election, for the seat of Arafura.

We coded five characteristics of candidates. The first three characteristics were candidates’ gender, political party, and whether they were the incumbent. These were based upon data from the Northern Territory Electoral Office, supplemented by incumbency information from the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly. In the case where a local member had just retired, none of the candidates were coded as incumbents.

The fourth characteristic we coded was candidates’ beauty. This was done by compiling the ballot photographs of the 79 candidates into a 2-page PDF document. We gave the following instruction to our raters:

"Please rate the attractiveness of each face on a 1–9 scale (1 = least attractive, 9 = most attractive). Try to use the scale optimally and maintain an average of 5."

To accommodate both the Indigenous and non-Indigenous population in the Northern Territory, and also to be representative of the gender and age of the Australian electorate in general, our raters were a 24-year-old Indigenous male, a 39-year-old Indigenous female, a 24-year-old non-Indigenous female, and a 40-year-old non-Indigenous male. None of the raters were familiar with any of the photographs, thus ruling out any rating contamination due to other accessible proxies (e.g. familiarity), and ensure that the rating was solely based on direct assessment of physical beauty itself. The rating process took each rater about half an hour (i.e. about 20 seconds per photograph). The raters were compensated with A$20 book vouchers.

The pairwise correlations between ratings are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the correlations between the four raters are uniformly moderate to high, ranging from 0.458 to 0.600. An important point here is that there is no substantial difference in beauty judgment between Indigenous and non-Indigenous raters, supporting the main finding of the beauty literature that people tend to have a general and reliable agreement over what constitutes beauty (Langlois et al., 2000; Rhodes, 2006).

The beauty measure we use in this paper aggregates the four raters’ beauty scores. This is done by rescaling each rater’s scores into a z-score (mean 0, standard deviation 1), creating a new variable that is the mean of the four z-scores, and then rescaling this average so that it has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

The fifth candidate characteristic we coded was skin color. This was done by one of the authors, using a 17-point scale that ran in even steps from white (0) to black (16). Fig. 2 depicts this scale. In our sample, candidates’ skin color ranged from 1 to 11, with a mean of 3.4.

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the 79 candidates in our sample. Across the sample, 28% of the candidates were incumbents, and 37% were women. Thirty-two percent represented the Australian Labor Party (ALP), 32% represented the Country Liberal Party (CLP), 14% represented the Greens, and the remainder were independents. On average, candidates received 32% of the vote. The average share of Indigenous voters in an electorate was 26%, though this was highly skewed (the median is 13%). Since both beauty and skin color are normalized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity, this has the advantage that regression coefficients for these variables can simply be interpreted as the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in beauty/skin darkness.

4. Beauty, skin color, and vote share

We begin by simply plotting the bivariate relationship between the key variables in the analysis. Fig. 3 depicts the relationship between beauty and vote share separately for challengers and incumbents. For challengers, a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 6.5 percentage point increase in vote share, while for incumbents, beauty has no statistically

---

6 Four raters are about the modal number used in studies of the economics of beauty. The correlations between beauty raters in our study are also quite similar to other studies, such as King and Leigh (2006). Since the lowest correlations were with the 40-year-old non-Indigenous male, we also experimented with dropping his ratings. We found that the results were very similar if we used only the average of the three other raters.

7 We also experimented with breaking the sample into two groups: the 53 candidates whose skin color was rated 3 or lighter, and the 26 candidates whose skin color was rated 4 or darker (see Fig. 2 for definitions of these numbers). We found that our raters tended to concur more on the ratings of darker-skinned candidates (correlations from 0.707 to 0.765) than lighter-skinned candidates (correlations from 0.251 to 0.572). However, we still did not observe any systematic tendency for the ratings of our Indigenous candidates to differ from the ratings of our non-Indigenous candidates.

8 Specifically, this 0–16 scale uses the following 17 html colors: FFFFFF, FF0000, E0E0E0, D0D0D0, C0C0C0, B0B0B0, A0A0A0, 909090, 808080, 707070, 606060, 505050, 404040, 303030, 202020, 101010, 000000.

9 The correlation between beauty (averaged from four ratings) and skin color was −0.04 (ns). We also estimated the correlation separately for each rater. The correlations between beauty rating and skin color for IM24, IF39, NIF24, and NIM40 were 0.126 (ns), −0.033 (ns), −0.231 (significant at 5% level), and 0.021 (ns), respectively. We therefore conclude that there is no systematic relationship between beauty rating and skin color in our sample.
significant impact on vote share. This is consistent with theories that suggest that beauty becomes less salient when voters have more information about a candidate, as is likely to be the case for incumbents.

By contrast with our results for beauty, we observe no uniform pattern between the color of a candidate's skin and their share of the vote across all electorates. This indicates that Northern Territory voters do not have a uniform preference for candidates with lighter or darker skin. However, it is possible that pooling the full sample is masking effects that run in opposite directions. Since the median Northern Territory electorate has 13.3% Indigenous voters, we separate electorates into two groups of approximately equal size – those in which less than 13% of the population are Indigenous, and those in which more than 13% of the population are Indigenous. For simplicity, we term these 'non-Indigenous electorates' and 'Indigenous electorates', respectively.

Table 1
Inter-rater beauty correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IM24</th>
<th>IF39</th>
<th>NIF24</th>
<th>NIM40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IM24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF39</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF24</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIM40</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample size is 79. All correlations are significant at the 1% level. IM24 is a 24-year-old Indigenous male, IF39 is a 39-year-old Indigenous female, NIF24 is a 24-year-old non-Indigenous female, and NIM40 is a 40-year-old non-Indigenous male. \( \mu \) is the mean beauty rating for each rater.

Fig. 1. A simple ballot paper from the 2005 Northern Territory election.

10 For challengers, the regression result is \( \text{Vote share} = 0.218 + 0.001 \times \text{SkinColor} \) \((t = 0.1) \) \((N = 57)\). For incumbents, the regression result is \( \text{Vote share} = 0.534 + 0.008 \times \text{SkinColor} \) \((t = 0.8) \) \((N = 22)\).
In Fig. 4, we chart the relationship between candidates’ skin color and their vote share separately for these two groups of electorates. Splitting the data in this manner reveals a very different pattern to that shown in the previous graph. Within non-Indigenous electorates, candidates with whiter skin receive more votes, while in Indigenous electorates, candidates with darker skin receive more votes. As with beauty, the relationship between skin color and electoral performance is stronger for challengers than incumbents. Across the four groups, the relationship between voting and skin color is strongest for challengers in non-Indigenous electorates.

Fig. 4 also reveals another factor about Northern Territory politics: candidates with quite dark skin simply choose not to run in non-Indigenous electorates. Of the eight candidates whose skin color was rated 7 or darker, all chose to run in Indigenous electorates.

To test these patterns more formally, we estimate regressions that take the form:

\[ V_{jk} = \alpha + \beta x_{jk} + \gamma z_{jk} E_k + v_{jk} \]  

where \( V_{jk} \) is the vote share of candidate \( j \) running in electorate \( k \), \( x_{jk} \) is a noisy signal of a universally liked characteristic, \( z_{jk} \) is a noisy signal of a voter-dependent characteristic, \( E_k \) is a characteristic of voters in electorate \( k \), and \( v_{jk} \) is a normally distributed mean-zero error term. To take account of the fact that votes in each electorate must sum up to 100%, standard errors are clustered at the electorate level.
Table 3 shows the results from these regressions. All specifications control for incumbency (which has a positive and significant effect on vote share) and whether the candidate is female (the coefficient is negative but insignificant). Without party fixed-effects (column 1), a one standard deviation increase in beauty boosts a candidate’s share of the vote by 6.1 percentage points. This is a substantial impact – using the same specification, King and Leigh (2006) find a coefficient of 2.2 percentage points for candidates in national elections. However, as column 2 shows, the beauty effect in Northern Territory elections is not robust to the inclusion of party fixed-effects.¹¹

¹¹ We also experimented with coding the photographs in other ways, but found that factors such as facial expression were not strongly correlated with a candidate’s share of the vote.
Column 3 shows the results from including a variable in the regression measuring the darkness of a candidate’s skin. This is then interacted with the share of voters in an electorate who are Indigenous. The main effect is significant and negative, while the interaction is significant and positive. These results are robust to the inclusion of party fixed-effects (column 4), to controlling for candidate beauty (column 5), and to interacting candidate beauty with the Indigenous share (column 6).12

Our preferred specification is column 4 (party fixed-effects but no controls for candidate beauty). In this column, the coefficient on Skin Darkness is $0.059$, and the coefficient on Skin Darkness × Share Indigenous is $0.114$. Both are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.

To see what these magnitudes imply, note that the share of the population who are Indigenous in Northern Territory electoral divisions ranges from 5% to 84%. The above coefficients imply that in the least Indigenous electorate, a one standard deviation increase in skin darkness would lower a candidate’s vote share by 5.3 percentage points, while in the most Indigenous electorate, a one standard deviation increase in skin darkness would raise a candidate’s vote share by 3.7 percentage points.

The fact that political parties do not run darker-skinned candidates in non-Indigenous electorates suggests that they may be aware of these patterns. Evidence of this comes from the 2001 election (the previous election to the one we analyze here), in which the CLP ran both an Indigenous and a non-Indigenous candidate in the 68% Indigenous seat of MacDonnell, successfully holding the seat.13 However, it is also possible that in electorates with few Indigenous voters, there are also few potential candidates with dark skin. In this event, the bias would arise from the racial composition of the electorate, rather than strategic decisions by the political parties.

5. Conclusions

The theoretical model posited in this paper separates candidate characteristics into two types: those that are universally liked, and those that are voter-dependent, meaning that they are liked only by those who share them. However, in our model, these traits are not directly observed by voters; they merely observe a noisy proxy.

Our empirical analysis focuses on candidates’ facial features. Using data from elections in the Northern Territory, we code two aspects of candidates’ facial features – their beauty, and their skin color. Although the effect of beauty on electoral outcomes has been studied before, we are not aware of any other study that has looked at the impact of skin color in an actual election.

Consistent with earlier studies, we find evidence that beauty is positively associated with candidates’ vote share (though the beauty effect is not robust to the inclusion of party fixed-effects). However, we find that the effect of skin color on vote share depends strongly upon the size of the Indigenous population in the electorate. The relationship between skin color and electoral performance is stronger for challengers than incumbents. This is consistent with beauty being a proxy for universally liked traits, and skin color being a proxy for voter-dependent traits.

It should be noted, however, that our finding is inconclusive regarding the issue of whether voters take skin color as a cue of group membership or as an inherently desirable characteristic. This issue is beyond the scope of our dataset. One way in

---

12 We obtain very similar results if the skin color variable is measured relative to other candidates running in the same electorate.

13 According to Worthington (2001), this tactic was also used by both the ALP and the CLP in the 1977 election for the seat of Tiwi (an election in which candidate photographs were not depicted on the ballot paper).
which future research may be able to solve the issue is by systematically distinguishing candidates’ policies from their skin color (e.g. a randomized trial in which half the experimental subjects had campaign materials and a photograph of the candidate; while the other had only the photograph). If skin color is a preferred characteristic of itself, then the availability of candidates’ policies should have no effect on the observed relationship between skin color and vote share. But if skin color is used as an indicator of group membership when other information is not available, then voters who have access to candidates’ policies – thereby have more direct information of the candidate’s group membership – would discard skin color as a cue. In this latter case, the relationship between skin color and vote share would be affected by policy positioning.

Since we only observe results from one election, we cannot determine whether the relationship between vote share and skin color in Northern Territory elections is stronger than it would be in the absence of ballot photographs. However, the effects of skin color on voting behavior in the Northern Territory are very strong, and it seems likely that skin color would be less salient in the absence of ballot photographs.

However, removing ballot photographs could have disadvantages. Given that the Northern Territory has the lowest literacy levels in Australia, the absence of ballot photographs would be likely to increase voter error. In addition, the removal of photographs from the ballot paper might decrease voter turnout. These factors would have to be weighed against any possible benefits from decreasing the salience of race in Northern Territory elections.

Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Bill Shepheard, the Northern Territory Electoral Commissioner, who devoted a great deal of time and energy to obtaining permission for us to use the ballot papers that form the basis of this study. Without Mr. Shepheard’s assistance, this paper would not have been possible. We also thank the political parties and individual candidates who ran in the 2005 Northern Territory election, almost all of whom gave us permission to use ballot papers that depicted their photographs. Susanne Schmidt and Elena Varganova provided outstanding research assistance. Peter Brent, Arya Gaduh, Murray Goot, Antony Green, Amy King, Firman Witoelar, the editor and an anonymous referee provided valuable feedback on the study. Naturally, these people should not be assumed to agree with the contents of this paper. All remaining errors are ours.

References


